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SINCE THE EARLY DAYS OF THE Cold War, observers have reproached American 
anticommunism by invoking the example of British moderation. Historians have often 
compared the British and American approaches to policing communism, finding that 
traditions of political toleration in the UK forestalled the extremities of political 
repression that culminated in the McCarthy era in the U.S. As one writer has put it, 
“The caution and concern for liberty displayed by the British would, if transferred to 
America, have prevented many heartbreaks and injustices in the United States.”1 In 
these accounts, when atomic spy scandals threatened the emerging Anglo-American 
“special relationship,” British officials adopted a moderate loyalty-screening program 
for civil servants at the United States’ behest, but avoided the sorts of abuses that 
have earned an abiding disrepute for American anticommunism. 
 However, the story is considerably more complicated. During the interwar 
years, British political policing operations dwarfed the American regime. The 
interwar British security services rivaled the Cold War–era FBI in the scale and scope 
of their surveillance operations. The development of the post–World War II American 																																																								
1 Karen Potter, “British McCarthyism,” in Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie, 
eds., North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays (Edinburgh, 1991), 143–157, 
here 155. 
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domestic security state was more of a break with the past than many histories suggest. 
In contrast, British domestic political policing continued a steady path of increasing 
authority and capacity from the early twentieth century through the early Cold War 
era. 
 These trajectories have been obscured by the nature of each country’s policing 
regime—the British more covert and the American more overt—and by the civil 
liberties discourses they produced. While the American federal crackdown on 
Communists was enacted democratically and publicly, the British built a “secret 
state” whose operations were often hidden from public view. A noisy civil liberties 
movement continually protested and publicized American political repression and 
helped to entrench knowledge of it for contemporaries and historians, whereas much 
of the UK’s surveillance and policing of Communists was unknown to the British 
public. As a result, historians have tended to overstate the stealth of the American 
security regime, and to understate the severity of the British. 
 For E. P. Thompson, the more open nature of American political repression 
made it easier to fight. In his 1979 essay “The Secret State,” Thompson contrasted the 
British security services, “distinguished by their invisibility and their lack of 
accountability,” to the United States’ “frightening enlargement of agencies of 
‘security.’” The very public nature of these American abuses made it possible to 
protest them, he argued. Thompson wrote in the wake of the post-Watergate 
investigations of the FBI and enactment of a robust federal Freedom of Information 
Act, and he echoed the civil liberties discourse that emphasized exposure and 
publicity as powerful tools to curb repression. “Thus the United States security organs 
are more powerful and more intrusive, but they have suffered a public check, are 
disgraced in the eyes of many American citizens and are at last subject to some legal 
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accountability,” he said. “In this area at least, the American liberal tradition has 
turned out to be much tougher than the British.”2 
 From our vantage point, Thompson’s argument seems wishful: neither 
country’s liberal tradition has proved very durable under duress. But his emphasis on 
the political significance of secrecy points to a useful analytical framework. Secrecy 
permitted a dramatically more comprehensive British regime, yet also empowered its 
agents to exercise more discretion, sometimes to the advantage of radicals and 
Communists. Publicity produced a civil liberties movement that curtailed the 
authority of the American regime, but also popular pressure to harass Communists 
and ultimately to enact severe statutory limits on their rights. The rise of the American 
security state fits neatly into historical narratives of modern American politics 
because it featured prominently in contemporary discourse, but the subterranean 
maneuvers of the British state are difficult to incorporate into histories of an era that 
was largely ignorant of them.4 
																																																								
2 E. P. Thompson, “The Secret State,” Race and Class 20, no. 3 (1979): 219–242, 
here 221, 222. On Thompson and the “Secret State” essay, see also Priya Satia, 
“Interwar Agnotology: Empire, Democracy, and the Production of Ignorance,” in 
Laura Beers and Geraint Thomas, Brave New World: Imperial and Democratic 
Nation-Building in Britain between the World Wars (London, 2011), 209–225. 
4 In this essay I use “security regime” to describe the institutional framework of 
political surveillance and policing, including its legal authority, personnel, and 
oversight. The notion of “national security” emerged in the 1930s and gradually 
broadened to entail a wide range of discourses concerned with an amorphous 
“national interest” set against external threats. See Arnold Wolfers, “‘National 
Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (1952): 
481–502; Andrew Preston, “Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National 
Security,” Diplomatic History 48, no. 3 (2014): 477–500. 
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 Comparison enables this perspective. It is hard to write comparatively about 
civil liberties and political repression, because the comparison risks diminishing or 
praising one regime or another—which is worse or better?5  Rather than venture 
specious evaluations of the merits of British or American approaches, the more 
important question is, how did their respective features develop? When and how did 
																																																								
5 Most studies of civil liberties examine national or imperial regimes, and there is not 
much comparative scholarship. Likely this is due to the tendencies of civil libertarians 
to “overwhelmingly restrict not simply their rhetorical appeals to national values but 
their activism to the domestic forum,” as Samuel Moyn has written in The Last 
Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, 2012), 38. In recent years, scholars 
have undertaken a more transnational history of “human rights,” in which national 
civil liberties campaigns operated as precursors to a broader human rights discourse. 
See, for example, Christopher Moores, “From Civil Liberties to Human Rights? 
British Civil Liberties Activism and Universal Human Rights,” Contemporary 
European History 21, no. 2 (2012): 169–192; Mark Mazower, “The Strange Triumph 
of Human Rights, 1933–1950,” The Historical Journal 47, no. 2 (2004): 379–398; 
Devin O. Pendas, “Toward a New Politics? On the Recent Historiography of Human 
Rights,” Contemporary European History 21, no. 1 (2012): 95–111. As for the 
comparative history of political repression, scholars have studied “state terrorism” 
regimes in Central America and in Africa. See, for example, James Petras, “State 
Terror and Social Movements in Latin America,” International Journal of Politics, 
Culture, and Society 3, no. 2 (1989): 179–212; Shadows of State Terrorism: Impunity 
in Latin America, Special Issue, Social Justice 26, no. 4 (1999); Gillian Duncan, Orla 
Lynch, Gilbert Ramsay, and Alison M. S. Watson, eds., State Terrorism and Human 
Rights: International Responses since the End of the Cold War (London, 2013). There 
is less research comparing repression in the U.S. and Western Europe, but see Mark 
Mazower’s “The Policing of Politics in Historical Perspective,” in Mazower, ed., The 
Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives (Oxford, 1997), 
241–256. 
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each state choose to police citizens’ politics?7  Comparative analysis has advantages 
over transnational methods for studying policing and repression. While transnational 
approaches seek to avoid narratives that reify the nation-state, these regimes were 
embedded in their respective state structures, and despite moments of transatlantic 
interpenetration between the U.S. and the UK, the differences mattered. Transnational 																																																								
7 In this essay I focus on policing of domestic subjects, and not, for example, British 
imperial subjects in India or American subalterns in the Philippines. Anglo-American 
civil liberties debates, then and now, rely on a conception of fundamental rights of 
speech, assembly, and freedom from political policing for citizens. The policing of 
other subjects is not my central concern here, but nevertheless underlies this story. On 
citizenship and civil liberties, see Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens 
and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, N.J., 2004); Sonya O. Rose, Which 
People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939–45 (Oxford, 2003); 
Keith McClelland and Sonya Rose, “Citizenship and Empire, 1867–1928,” in 
Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose, eds., At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture 
and the Imperial World (Cambridge, 2006), 275–297. For recent studies that 
investigate interwar policing of imperial subjects, see Michael Goebel, Anti-Imperial 
Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism (Cambridge, 
2015); Clifford Rosenberg, Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration 
Control between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y., 2006). For an exemplary comparative 
analysis of imperial surveillance regimes, see Martin Thomas, Empires of 
Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley, Calif., 
2008). New scholarship on the construction of America’s “carceral state” focuses on 
the postwar criminalization and policing of African American and gay communities. 
See, for instance, Heather Ann Thompson, “Why Mass Incarceration Matters: 
Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History,” 
Journal of American History 97, no. 3 (2010): 703–734; Timothy Stewart-Winter, 
“Queer Law and Order: Sex, Criminality, and Policing in the Late Twentieth-Century 
United States,” Journal of American History 102, no. 1 (2015), 61–72; Matthew D. 
Lassiter, “Impossible Criminals: The Suburban Imperatives of America’s War on 
Drugs,” ibid., 126–140. 
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history has paid more attention to “transnational do-gooding” than to practices such as 
the “ties between dictatorships” or “covert operations and intelligence,” as Pierre-
Yves Saunier points out, and one reason surely lies in the field’s efforts to de-center 
the state and avoid essentialist accounts of national histories.8 It is true that modern 
political policing transcended state boundaries and drew on dynamics of imperial 
governance, yet dropping out the state can cloud what was specific, and idiosyncratic, 
about domestic policing regimes. A transnational approach can illuminate the 
connections that led the governments of the U.S. and the UK to collaborate and 
quarrel about managing domestic subversion, and civil libertarians to caucus in 
transatlantic networks, but make it hard to see how their common language masked 
different categories. Who counted as a subversive Communist? What did policing 
entail? The same words had different meanings in each country’s practices. 
Comparison, by contrast, can “throw a wrench in overdetermined historical 
narratives,” as Deborah Cohen has remarked, and avoid the pitfalls of implicit and 
explicit parallels often drawn by contemporaries and scholars.9 
																																																								
8 Pierre-Yves Saunier, “Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave 
Dictionary of International History,” Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 2 
(2008): 159–180, here 170. 
9 Deborah Cohen, “Comparative History: Buyer Beware,” in Deborah Cohen and 
Maura O’Connor, eds., Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National 
Perspective (New York, 2004), 57–69, here 64. The distinction between 
“comparative” and “transnational” history is sometimes murky, reflecting the 
analytical fuzziness of transnational history. For a trenchant discussion of 
comparative and transnational methods, see Simon MacDonald, “Transnational 
History: A Review of Past and Present Scholarship,” January 2013, UCL Centre for 
Transnational History, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/centre-transnational-
history/objectives/simon_macdonald_tns_review. 
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 In fact, it is transnationally grounded theoretical accounts of surveillance 
regimes that often commit the sin of essentialism, constructing a teleology that sets all 
states on the same path toward panopticism. While historians have tended to study 
national or imperial political policing regimes in isolation, social theorists have drawn 
on their accounts to make general arguments about the nature of the “surveillance 
state.” Such interpretations homogenize the rise of liberal states as expressing an 
inexorable logic of centralizing state power, with Giorgio Agamben’s “state of 
exception” a recent version of this argument. Yet these histories are more 
discontinuous than scholars such as Agamben suggest, and their reliance on a narrow 
archival base leads many theorists to paper over the variability and complexity of 
these security regimes. Moreover, surveillance often did not derive from executive 
decrees; rather, legislatures initiated and enacted laws that criminalized subversion 
and authorized the policing of politics.10 Hence surveillance and policing practices 
reveal as much about the particular political cultures of their respective states as about 
the logic of surveillance itself. Comparison of surveillance regimes on their own 
																																																								
10 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago, 2005). For a 
critique of Agamben’s “formalist conception of law” and its incompatibility with 
American political structures, see William J. Novak, Stephen W. Sawyer, and James 
T. Sparrow, “Democratic States of Unexception: Toward a New Genealogy of the 
American Political,” in Kimberly J. Morgan and Ann Shola Orloff, eds., The Many 
Hands of the State: Theorizing Political Authority and Social Control (Cambridge, 
2017), 229–257. On Agamben’s elision of countervailing state structures such as 
legislatures and judiciaries, see Stephen Humphreys, “Legalizing Lawlessness: On 
Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception,” European Journal of International Law 17, 
no. 3 (2006): 677–687. 
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terms—“comparisons of rather than comparisons to,” in Philippa Levine’s words—
sunders this universalist narrative by revealing their specific trajectories.11 
 Policing and repression often tacitly operate in these accounts as the extreme 
manifestation—the sharp end of the spear—of the logic of surveillance. But modern 
domestic policing, defined as the lawful regulation of subjects in the service of state 
authority, does not have a straightforward relationship to surveillance.12 Watching did 
not necessarily produce repression, and surveillance was not always secret. 
Surveillance could be covert or overt, policing secret or public, and these 
configurations varied across space and time.13 
																																																								
11 Philippa Levine, “Is Comparative History Possible?,” History and Theory 53, no. 3 
(2014): 331–347, here 340. Of course, comparison can also reveal similarities. Martin 
Thomas’s comparative study of colonial policing shows how economic crisis eroded 
imperial capitalist logics in numerous interwar colonial regimes, as labor control 
became an increasingly important function of colonial police in the 1930s. Thomas, 
Violence and the Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European 
Colonial Empires, 1918–1940 (Cambridge, 2012). 
12 As Clive Emsley writes, “To the extent that they are expected to enforce a code of 
laws and dominant conceptions of social order, the police cannot, in the broad sense, 
be anything other than political.” Emsley, “Political Police and the European Nation-
State,” in Mazower, The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century, 1–25, here 1–
2. Western policing often regulated waged workers, of course, to sustain capitalist 
production as well as unfree and enslaved labor regimes; ultimately this policing also 
reinforced state authority. 
13 This essay is weighted more toward historiographical analysis in the U.S. case and 
empirical findings in the British case. This is due to the nature of their respective 
histories and historiographies. As I will argue, there is little integration of British 
interwar repression into broader historical narratives, and much more research still to 
be done. There is a lot of scholarship on U.S. interwar repression, and less empirical 	
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MASS POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE IS A hallmark of the modern state, as Christopher 
Bayly remarked, and it features centrally in theoretical work by scholars ranging from 
Michel Foucault to James Scott.14 “Surveillance” has become a generic shorthand for 
the diffusion of practices of watching, counting, and recording the actions of citizens 
and subjects.15 Yet the very ubiquity of surveillance obscures how differently states 
have used it. “Scholars are simply not confronted with good states that refrained from 
using surveillance versus bad states that resorted to it,” as Peter Holquist argues. “We 
confront instead differences—crucial differences—in how and to what ends all 
regimes practiced surveillance.”16 The uses of surveillance, rather than the fact of its 
deployment, constitute a natural axis of comparison in modern history. 
																																																																																																																																																														
research outstanding—to the contrary, existing syntheses sometimes misrepresent its 
history. 
14 C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914 (London, 2004), 145; 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York, 1979); 
James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn., 1998). 
15 “Surveillance studies” has recently emerged as a multidisciplinary field with its 
own journal (Surveillance & Society), scholarly associations, and readers; see, for 
example, Sean P. Hier and Joshua Greenberg, The Surveillance Studies Reader 
(Maidenhead, UK, 2007); Kirstie Ball, Kevin D. Haggerty, and David Lyon, 
Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies (London, 2014); Kees Boersma, 
Rosamunde Van Brakel, Chiara Fonio, and Pieter Wagenaar, Histories of State 
Surveillance in Europe and Beyond (New York, 2014). As a field, surveillance studies 
tends to draw on sociology, political science, and cultural studies rather than history. 
16 Peter Holquist, “‘Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work’: Bolshevik 
Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context,” Journal of Modern History 69, no. 3 
(1997): 415–450, here 449. 
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 A confluence of events—the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of some 
repressive governments such as the Khmer Rouge, the political success of campaigns 
for lustration and “freedom of information,” and phenomena such as WikiLeaks—has 
now forced open the archives of political police around the world. We are able to see 
how surveillance was conducted, the information it produced, and what police did 
with that information. Historians have begun to produce scholarship that disrupts 
blanket narratives of the “surveillance state.” A number of studies have examined the 
protean uses of surveillance by totalitarian and dictatorial states. Holquist’s work on 
Russian “perlustration” under tsarism and the early Bolshevik government shows both 
regimes using mail interception to assay popular opinion. This surveillance functioned 
something like a prototypical focus group, to aid in devising more effective 
propaganda. By contrast, in Russia and Eastern Europe under Communism in the 
1930s and 1970s, Cristina Vatulescu describes a “spectacle of secrecy” in which 
political police continually signaled their presence, instilling a constant and 
sometimes ironic awareness of scrutiny among the population. Colonial and captive 
states produced quite different systems. Alfred McCoy finds a “politics of scandal” in 
the Philippines, in which the constabulary amassed incriminating dossiers that could 
be deployed against both Filipino and American challengers to colonial rule: a 
discipline of decorum. In Guatemala, on the other hand, Kirsten Weld shows how 
American advisors trained police in the 1960s to systematize surveillance records in 
order to “disappear” activists.17 While all states sought to “see” their subjects, what 
																																																								
17 Holquist, “Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work”; Cristina Vatulescu, 
Police Aesthetics: Literature, Film, and the Secret Police in Soviet Times (Stanford, 
Calif., 2010); Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the 
Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison, Wis., 2009); Kirsten 	
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they did with what they saw varied. Surveillance could be more or less covert or 
overt, and so could policing. Analyzing when and how these practices were secret or 
public reveals much about the nature of political authority. 
 Among liberal regimes, the U.S. and the UK stand out as a particularly good 
comparison.18 In the early years of the Cold War, observers increasingly drew a 
distinction between American excess and British toleration. In 1950, when Parliament 
debated a proposal for stricter loyalty investigations for civil servants, Lord Vansittart 
insisted that “the British Upper Chamber will set an example to the American Upper 
Chamber” with none of the “ballyhoo of Senator McCarthy.”19 Meanwhile, American 
civil libertarians, aghast at the abuses of McCarthyism, looked to Britain as a bulwark 
of political reason. “In these days of concern about our civil liberties, the American 
often casts longing eyes across the seas to England,” wrote Robert Carr, a professor of 
law at Dartmouth, in 1956. There was “an air of sanity and calmness and a spirit of 
																																																																																																																																																														
Weld, Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala (Durham, N.C., 
2014). See also Deborah Susan Bauer, “Marianne Is Watching: Knowledge, Secrecy, 
Intelligence, and the Origins of the French Surveillance State (1870–1914)” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2013). 
18 As Deborah Cohen advises, “Least likely to go wrong are those topics that begin 
from a point of relation, those that seemed to contemporaries themselves inherently 
comparative”; “Comparative History,” 65. For a comparison of Cold War–era 
anticommunism in the U.S., Canada, and Britain, see Reg Whitaker, “Cold War 
Alchemy: How America, Britain and Canada Transformed Espionage into 
Subversion,” Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (2000): 177–210. 
19 House of Lords Debates 166, March 29, 1950, 609. 
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assuredness in England” sustained by “faith in established institutions, trust in the 
common sense and confidence in the honesty and fairness of public officials.”20 
 Historians have echoed these assessments: the UK as tolerant, the U.S. as 
repressive. While these accounts specify McCarthyism and its related abuses as the 
moment of dramatic divergence between the two countries, they often back into 
broader reflections on differences in political culture, finding in the U.S. a tradition of 
what Richard Hofstadter called “the paranoid style in American politics,” and in 
Britain a tradition of moderation.21 In his still widely cited 1978 book The Great 
Fear, David Caute attributed the difference to “the authentically liberal values and 
standards of tolerance that persisted in Britain,” while in the U.S. a “cultural, 
idealistic, self-righteous, moral,” and “even messianic image of its own mission” had 
gripped the country.22 Britain’s “phlegmatic political tradition,” wrote Peter 
Hennessy, and “the power of the party machines” explained its culture of 
																																																								
20 Robert K. Carr, “Civil Liberties—The British Way,” New York Times, January 22, 
1956, 9. See also Carr, “Observations by an American on English Civil Liberties,” in 
Milton R. Konvitz and Clinton Rossiter, eds., Aspects of Liberty: Essays Presented to 
Robert E. Cushman (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958), 235–253. The sociologist Edward Shils, 
writing in 1956, likewise found a “political equilibrium” in Britain that rested on 
stable class relations and respect for political hierarchy, versus a disequilibrium in the 
U.S. that was fed by anxieties produced by populism and social mobility; Shils, The 
Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security 
Policies (London, 1956). 
21 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays 
(New York, 1965). 
22 David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and 
Eisenhower (London, 1978), 20–22. 
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moderation.23 In the United States, by contrast, scholars describe a longstanding 
tradition of intolerance and repression, with McCarthyism as the peak on a continuous 
trajectory of increasing antiradical repression and antipathy that began long before 
1917.24 
 Contemporaries can be forgiven their misconceptions, as they relied on 
information that was widely available at the time. However, scholars have ample 																																																								
23 Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain, 1945–51 (London, 1992), 409. See also, for 
instance, Marc J. Selverstone’s argument that “[t]his absence of a comparable British 
[grassroots anticommunist] lobby highlights the two political cultures’ differing views 
on anticommunism. The distinction is likely attributable to a more populist and 
participatory ethos in the United States, as well as to the structural elements of the 
respective political systems. In the end, McCarthyism simply could not take root in 
British soil.” Selverstone, Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great 
Britain, and International Communism, 1945–1950 (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), 203. 
Brian Harrison echoes this argument, attributing “[l]iberty’s informal defence within 
the UK” to “cultural factors.” Harrison, Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951–
1970 (Oxford, 2009), 431. “[T]he British system [of handling Communists] seems 
considerably closer to the ideal than the system in the United States,” according to 
Joan Mahoney, due to “American Exceptionalism” and the limits of constitutionalism. 
Mahoney, “Constitutionalism, the Rule of Law, and the Cold War,” in Tom 
Campbell, K. D. Ewing, and Adam Tomkins, eds., The Legal Protection of Human 
Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford, 2011), 127–147, here 145. 
24 See, for instance, Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, 
1991); Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Boston, 
1998); M. J. Heale, American Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within, 1830–
1970 (Baltimore, 1990); Larry Ceplair, Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century 
America: A Critical History (Santa Barbara, Calif., 2011), 4; Landon R. Y. Storrs, 
“McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
American History, 
http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001
/acrefore-9780199329175-e-6. 
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evidence to revise their interpretations. In Britain, public releases of documents 
beginning in the 1990s have enabled historians to reconstruct the operations of a large 
and very secretive domestic security apparatus that operated continuously from the 
late nineteenth century. In the U.S., beginning with the revelations of the Senate 
Church Committee in the 1970s, many FBI investigative files have been released to 
the public.25 Moreover, continuous public investigation exposed many aspects of 
American political policing as it happened. Why, then, do these historical 
misconceptions persist? 
 
POLITICAL POLICING ACCOMPANIED the rise of the absolutist state, but it was the 
Bolshevik Revolution that produced its modern form: as Mark Mazower has pointed 
out, it “provided a permanent justification for expanding political policing work in 
capitalist societies.”26 In the early twentieth century, the organization of political 																																																								
25 Richard J. Aldrich estimated that in general, British record releases lagged “about a 
decade behind [those] of the United States.” Aldrich, Espionage, Security, and 
Intelligence in Britain, 1945–1970 (Manchester, 1998), 11. It is important to 
remember that these releases are deliberate, not comprehensive, and due caution is 
always required in developing conclusions based on partial sources. As Aldrich 
warns, “Historians are what they eat and the convenient but unwholesome diet of 
processed food on offer in national archives has resulted in a flabby historical 
posture.” Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret 
Intelligence (London, 2001), 6. 
26 Mazower, “The Policing of Politics in Historical Perspective,” 244. In this study, I 
am not examining surveillance in service of broad state efforts to understand citizens’ 
political views and to mold them, as in the case of the sweeping postal interceptions 
described by Holquist, but rather what he calls “policing-style surveillance—
gathering information on individual troublemakers as a preventive measure.” This 
policing-style surveillance provided the ground for straightforward regulation of 	
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policing mirrored the structure of the state in the U.S. and the UK: the American 
version more dispersed and fragmented, with authority often delegated to private 
agencies, and the British version more centralized and directly managed by the state.27 
																																																																																																																																																														
citizens: arrest, imprisonment, denial of civil liberties and access to the perquisites of 
citizenship such as civil-service jobs, and so on. Holquist, “‘Information Is the Alpha 
and Omega of Our Work,’” 439. 
27 On the dispersed and decentralized nature of the American state, see William J. 
Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996); Brian Balogh, A Government out of Sight: The Mystery of 
National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge, Mass., 2009); Gary 
Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the 
Founding to the Present (Princeton, N.J., 2015). My analysis here follows Margot 
Canaday’s view that federal state capacity remained comparatively limited in the 
early twentieth century. Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in 
Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, N.J., 2009), 1. On the early centralization of 
the British state, see John Brewer, Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English 
State, 1688–1783 (Cambridge, Mass., 1990). Compared to its European counterparts, 
the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century British state was minimalist and laissez-
faire in the eyes of contemporaries and historians, and began to amass significant 
centralized power only with the creation of the postwar welfare state. A number of 
historians have recently reconsidered British state development, thinking “beyond 
weak and strong,” in the words of Peter Baldwin, and analyzing how taxation, health 
policy, and especially empire created forms of governmentality beyond central 
bureaucratic capacity. Baldwin, “Beyond Weak and Strong: Rethinking the State in 
Comparative Policy History,” Journal of Policy History 17, no. 1 (2005): 12–33; 
Baldwin, “The Victorian State in Comparative Perspective,” in Peter Mandler, ed., 
Liberty and Authority in Victorian Britain (Oxford, 2006), 51–67; Simon Gunn and 
James Vernon, “Introduction: What Was Liberal Modernity and Why Was It Peculiar 
in Imperial Britain?,” in Gunn and Vernon, eds., The Peculiarities of Liberal 
Modernity in Imperial Britain (Berkeley, Calif., 2011), 1–18. David Edgerton has 
shown how the British built a “military-industrial-scientific complex which was, in 	
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The U.S. lacked a national police force, and the authority to police insurgents—
strikers, anarchists, and radicals—largely fell to local police forces and to private 
detective agencies such as the Pinkertons. This regime drew regular protests from 
trade unions, which engineered congressional hearings to publicize abuses of private 
detective agencies—the Senate hearings on labor and capital in 1883, the Commission 
on Industrial Relations in 1912—as well as muckraking journalism on what workers 
called “the labor spy.”28 By contrast, beginning in the 1840s, the UK had organized a 
national network of local police. In 1883, Fenian bombings and the threat of 
anarchism sparked the creation of “Special Branch,” dedicated to policing domestic 
unrest.29 Imperial politics shaped British political policing: the effort to quell colonial 
unrest produced technologies that circulated between metropole and colonies, and 
many officials also circulated such as Vernon Kell, the first head of MI5, who fought 
in the Boxer Rebellion and later served as an intelligence officer at the War Office.30 																																																																																																																																																														
the phrase of the time, ‘second to none’” in the early twentieth century, creating a 
“warfare state” that was hardly minimalist. Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–
1970 (Cambridge, 2006), 1. As I show, antiradical surveillance and policing 
constituted another realm of robust British central-state capacity. 
28 See, for example, Sidney Howard, The Labor Spy: A Survey of Industrial 
Espionage (New York, 1924). 29	On the development of England’s dispersed but nationally coordinated local police, 
see David Philips and Robert D. Storch, Policing Provincial England, 1829–1856: 
The Politics of Reform (Leicester, 1999); Philips, “A ‘Weak State’? The English 
State, the Magistracy, and the Reform of Policing in the 1830s,” English Historical 
Review 119, no. 483 (2004): 873–891. On Special Branch, see Bernard Porter, The 
Origins of the Vigilant State: The London Metropolitan Police Special Branch before 
the First World War (London, 1987).	
30 On imperial policing, see Thomas, Violence and the Colonial Order; C. A. Bayly, 
Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 	
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In 1909, German spy scares led Britain to form the Secret Service, with MI5 given 
authority over counterespionage.31 The U.S. had created the federal Bureau of 
Investigation (BI) the previous year, with a far more limited brief to investigate 
mostly antitrust and interstate commerce issues. Many of its first agents came from 
																																																																																																																																																														
1780–1870 (Cambridge, 1996). Alfred McCoy has argued that policing practices 
pioneered in the U.S. occupation of the Philippines became the basis for the World 
War I–era American security regime; Policing America’s Empire, chap. 9. Like other 
historians, I find this aspect of his argument unconvincing. The porous boundaries 
between the early BI and American detective agencies meant that their methods and 
practices, including meticulous recordkeeping, were far more influential than the 
Philippine occupation. 
31 On Kell, see Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British 
Intelligence Community (London, 1985), 59–60; Porter, Origins of the Vigilant State, 
170–172. Historians of MI5 and Special Branch note that their staffs and budgets 
waxed and waned and their institutional relationships shifted. For example, MI5, 
charged with policing subversion in the armed services and counter-espionage, saw its 
budget cut after World War I. Scotland Yard had authority over civil subversion until 
1931, when MI5 saw its authority expanded to all counter-subversion. For my 
purposes, the staffing and financing of any particular policing agency is less 
significant than the fact that they operated nationally in a coordinated way, and that 
local police often functioned as investigative staff for the national agencies, enabling 
a comprehensive security regime. Eric Holt-Wilson, deputy head of MI5, made this 
point in 1934. MI5 had “the full personal confidence and daily services of all the 
British Police throughout the Empire. In Britain alone this includes 245 Civil Chiefs 
of Police and their 65,000 Civil Police, amongst whom are over 7,000 plain clothes 
men and detectives,” he said. Imperial War Museum, London, Papers of Major 
General Sir Vernon Kell KBE, H[olt]-W[ilson], “Security Intelligence in War,” 
lecture notes, 1934. For the institutional history, see Christopher Andrew, Defence of 
the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London, 2009); Kevin Quinlan, The 
Secret War between the Wars: MI5 in the 1920s and 1930s (Woodbridge, 2014). 
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private detective agencies, and their experience in policing strikers shaped the early 
politics of the BI.32 
 War, as ever, was the health of the surveillance state.33 During World War I, 
both the U.S. and the UK enacted a raft of laws that criminalized dissent—the 
Espionage Act and the Sedition Act in the U.S., the Defence of the Realm Act in the 
UK. In the case of the U.S., this required a dramatic expansion of federal policing, 
and in characteristic American fashion, the BI deputized freelance private detectives 
and vigilant citizen groups. The UK, by contrast, hired thousands of agents for MI5 
and the Secret Intelligence Service, as well as for Special Branch. In both countries 
during the war, police investigated and imprisoned thousands of pacifists and antiwar 
activists. The Bolshevik Revolution cast a red tint on domestic dissent, and both 
countries arrested and deported Communist organizers, with the U.S. crackdown 
considerably more severe.34 It is worth emphasizing, pace Agamben, that the legal 																																																								
32 The BI was renamed the FBI in 1935. On early labor policing, see Beverly Gage, 
The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in Its First Age of Terror (New 
York, 2009); J. Anthony Lukas, Big Trouble: A Murder in a Small Western Town Sets 
Off a Struggle for the Soul of America (New York, 1998); Jennifer Luff, “Surrogate 
Supervisors: Railway Spotters and the Origins of Workplace Surveillance,” Labor: 
Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas 5, no. 1, (2008): 47–74. On the 
early history of the FBI, see Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. 
Edgar Hoover (New York, 1986); Athan Theoharis, ed., From the Secret Files of J. 
Edgar Hoover (Chicago, 1991); Athan G. Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, The Boss: 
J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition (Philadelphia, 1988). 
33 Randolph S. Bourne, “The State,” in Carl Resek, ed., War and the Intellectuals: 
Essays by Randolph S. Bourne, 1915-1919 (New York, 1964), 69.	
34 For the U.S., see Athan G. Theoharis, The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide 
(Westport, Conn., 1999); Robert K. Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 
1919–1920 (1955; repr., New York, 1964); William Preston Jr., Aliens and 	
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authority for both of these systems derived from democratically enacted legislation, 
not executive authority. 
																																																																																																																																																														
Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933, 2nd ed. (Urbana, Ill., 
1963); Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making 
of the Modern American Citizen (New York, 2008). For the UK, see K. D. Ewing and 
C. A. Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law 
in Britain, 1914–1945 (Oxford, 2000). There is very little scholarship on British 
anticommunism as a standalone ideology or set of practices; indeed, “British 
anticommunism” is something of an oxymoron in interwar historiography, which 
more frequently explores “extremism,” lumping together Fascism and Communism, 
and state efforts to combat both. By contrast, there is a significant literature on “anti-
socialism”; see, for example, Kenneth D. Brown, “The Anti-Socialist Union, 1908–
1949,” in Brown, ed., Essays in Anti-Labour History: Responses to the Rise of Labour 
in Britain (Basingstoke, 1974), 234–261; Ross McKibbin, “Class and Conventional 
Wisdom: The Conservative Party and the ‘Public’ in Inter-War Britain,” in McKibbin, 
Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880–1950 (Oxford, 1990), chap. 9; 
Laura Beers, “Counter-Toryism: Labour’s Response to Anti-Socialist Propaganda, 
1918–39,” in Matthew Worley, ed., The Foundations of the British Labour Party: 
Identities, Cultures and Perspectives, 1900–39 (Farnham, 2009), 231–254. Yet 
British anticommunism was fierce. Antony Best has argued that in the interwar years, 
“a ‘cold war’ of sorts existed between Britain and the Soviet Union.” Best, “‘We Are 
Virtually at War with Russia’: Britain and the Cold War in East Asia, 1923–40,” Cold 
War History 12, no. 2 (2012): 205–225, here 218. Victor Madeira makes a similar 
argument in Britannia and the Bear: The Anglo-Russian Intelligence Wars, 1917–
1929 (Woodbridge, 2014). Soviet support for anti-imperial movements was a major 
source of British hostility. Priya Satia finds extensive evidence of British concern 
about an Arab-Bolshevik “conspiracy” in the Middle East in Satia, Spies of Arabia: 
The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the 
Middle East (New York, 2008), chap. 6; as does Thomas in Empires of Intelligence, 
90–100. 
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 During the war, German spies and Indian revolutionaries plotting in the U.S. 
caused the British government to set up an intelligence outpost in New York, giving 
British officials a close look at American investigative methods. They were not 
impressed. The BI had failed to notice German agents who were operating brazenly in 
New York. Worse, American officials were reluctant to move against the Ghadar 
movement of South Asian revolutionaries on the West Coast. Tensions mounted as 
British agents remained in the U.S. after the war, turning their attention to 
Communists, and in 1920 the State Department formally ordered them to cease 
operations on American soil. This short-lived coordination left a legacy of mutual 
suspicion that precluded further cooperation in domestic policing in the interwar 
years.35 From the early 1920s through the late 1930s, MI5 and the BI had little 
contact.36 
																																																								
35 On British operations in the U.S. during the war, see Richard J. Popplewell, 
Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian 
Empire, 1904–1924 (London, 2004); Don K. Dignan, “The Hindu Conspiracy in 
Anglo-American Relations during World War I,” Pacific Historical Review 40, no. 1 
(1971): 57–76; Richard B. Spence, “Englishmen in New York: The SIS American 
Station, 1915–21,” Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 3 (2004): 511–537. On 
the Ghadar movement, see Maia Ramnath, Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar 
Movement Charted Global Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow the British 
Empire (Berkeley, Calif., 2011) and Seema Sohi, Echoes of Mutiny: Race, 
Surveillance, and Indian Anticolonialism in North America (New York, 2014). 
36 Thanks to John Fox, the FBI’s in-house historian, for clarification on the interwar 
relationship between the FBI and British security services. This is not to say that there 
was no contact whatsoever between the two security regimes. When MI5 officials 
sought information from American sources, they sometimes reached out to Ray 
Atherton, the first secretary at the U.S. Embassy in London. See, for instance, Kell’s 
letter concerning leftist activist John Strachey’s visit to the U.S. in The National 	
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 At war’s end, then, the British and American security regimes looked rather 
alike: vastly expanded domestic surveillance forces with broad powers to police 
dissent. At this moment, the two states diverged sharply: while Britain retained its 
domestic policing system, the U.S. dismantled much of its new federal apparatus. The 
American wartime regime had been a sharper rupture with the past, a dramatic 
expansion and centralization of state power. It gave rise to a widespread backlash. 
Over the next twenty years, a loose coalition mobilized to expose and publicize the 
abuses of political police, both federal and private. This coalition included trade 
unionists, law professors, leftists, and the newly created American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU). They drew on past experience of attacking the private detective 
agencies: they conducted their own investigations, organized congressional hearings, 
and challenged the statutory authority of political police. In the 1920s, they focused 
on the federal Justice Department; in the 1930s, they trained their sights on private 
detectives and local police.37 
 In 1920, civil libertarians scuttled efforts to renew the Sedition Act, thus 
eliminating the legal authority for the Bureau of Investigation to police domestic 
politics. After 1920, it had no legal ground to surveil native Communists or other 
radical groups. But the BI (headed by the former head of a private detective agency, 																																																																																																																																																														
Archives, Kew, UK [hereafter TNA], Records of the Security Service, KV 2/786, 
Vernon Kell to Ray Atherton, February 22, 1935; or Kell’s sharing of intelligence 
concerning American Communist William Weinstone, in KV 2/4234, Kell to 
Atherton, July 7, 1933. 
37 On the origins of the ACLU, see Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: 
A History of the ACLU (New York, 1990); Robert C. Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin 
and the American Civil Liberties Union (New York, 2000); John Fabian Witt, 
“Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist Beginnings of Civil Liberties,” Duke Law 
Journal 54, no. 3 (2004): 705–763. 
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William J. Burns) continued secretly to tail strikers, Wobblies, and Communists for 
several years.38 The ACLU began to argue that “the nation-wide spy system” growing 
within the BI, which engaged in “the collection of a mass of material about radicals, 
the dissemination of propaganda, and espionage on radical and labor organizations,” 
was itself a violation of civil liberties.39 In early 1924, as the ACLU amassed 
evidence for a congressional investigation, a congressional bribery scandal turned up 
evidence of BI agents spying on congressmen.40 That March, President Calvin 
Coolidge fired the attorney general and appointed Columbia Law School dean Harlan 
Fiske Stone to head the Justice Department. Stone promoted a junior staffer, J. Edgar 
Hoover, to acting director of the BI, and they quickly reorganized the Bureau. By 																																																								
38 In 1922, Burns’s Bureau organized a raid on the Communist Party USA in 
Michigan, arresting its leaders for sedition, but they had to keep their role secret, and 
pressure the state of Michigan to bring charges against the party leaders, because the 
federal government had no statutory authority to police Communists. On this episode, 
see Michal R. Belknap, “Uncooperative Federalism: The Failure of the Bureau of 
Investigation’s Intergovernmental Attack on Radicalism,” Publius 12, no. 2 (1982): 
25–47; and Jennifer Luff, Commonsense Anticommunism: Labor and Civil Liberties 
between the World Wars (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2012), 96–99, 104–105. On the Burns-
era Bureau of Investigation, see Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded; and Richard 
Gid Powers, Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI (New York, 
2004). 
39 American Civil Liberties Union, The Nation-Wide Spy System Centering in the 
Department of Justice: Facts Showing the Enormous Recent Growth of a 
Governmental Secret Police System, Engaged in Espionage, Intimidation, 
Propaganda and Provocative Acts (New York, 1924), 5. 
40 See, for example, American Civil Liberties Union Records: The Roger Baldwin 
Years, 1917–1950 (microfilm ed., Wilmington, Del., 1996), reel 35, vol. 250, W. Jett 
Lauck to Roger Baldwin, February 13, 1924, and April 12, 1924, and Roger Baldwin 
to Committee on Appropriations, May 8, 1924. 
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August, Stone and Hoover told Baldwin that “the department dealing with radical 
activities has been entirely abolished. There is not a single man in the department 
especially assigned to that work.”41 By 1924, civil libertarians had succeeded in 
disabling both the statutory authority and the secret surveillance apparatus of the 
nation’s political police. In the following years, Hoover’s FBI turned its attention to 
chasing gangsters and “white slavery” sex traffickers, and left the policing of radicals 
to local authorities.42 
 While historians sometimes treat this episode as a sham, antiradical activists 
regarded the BI’s withdrawal as a security threat and lobbied hard to restore to the 
Bureau the authority to police Communists. In 1930, a special congressional 																																																								
41 Ibid., reel 38, vol. 271–272, Roger Baldwin, “Memorandum on the interview with 
the Attorney-General and with John W. Hoover [sic], acting head of the Bureau of 
Investigation (August 4),” August 7, 1924. Hoover told Baldwin that he would be 
unable to destroy the existing confidential files, “for he has no authority to destroy 
records in the Department and it could not be done without an act of Congress,” but 
he promised to keep them secret. 
42 On the FBI and the image of the G-Man, see Claire Bond Potter, War on Crime: 
Bandits, G-Men, and the Politics of Mass Culture (New Brunswick, N.J., 1998). On 
the FBI and the policing of sexuality, see Jessica R. Pliley, Policing Sexuality: The 
Mann Act and the Making of the FBI (Cambridge, Mass., 2014). New scholarship on 
sexuality and civil liberties has greatly expanded our understanding of both the FBI 
and the ACLU. See Leigh Ann Wheeler, How Sex Became a Civil Liberty (New York, 
2013); Laura M. Weinrib, “The Sex Side of Civil Liberties: United States v. Dennett 
and the Changing Face of Free Speech,” Law and History Review 30, no. 2 (2012): 
325–386. For a recent account of FBI surveillance of African American writers, see 
William J. Maxwell, F.B. Eyes: How J. Edgar Hoover’s Ghostreaders Framed 
African American Literature (Princeton, N.J., 2015). Maxwell notes that Hoover’s 
FBI took an “anomalous break” from surveilling writers from 1924 until the late 
1930s; ibid., 17, 76–80. 
		 24	
committee headed by U.S. Representative Hamilton Fish of New York convened six 
months of hearings to mobilize support for such a law. Yet witnesses repeatedly 
decried “secret police” and urged Congress against empowering them. J. Edgar 
Hoover himself testified in closed session that while “there should be a law which 
prohibits you or I or anybody else individually or collectively going down on 
Pennsylvania Avenue and advocating the overthrow of the Government by force and 
violence,” unfortunately “there is no law to-day along that line,” and thus the FBI 
could not police sedition.43 In the end, Congress voted against authorizing the FBI to 
police radicals, and in 1934 refused to extend authority to police Fascists as well.44 
Meanwhile, the growing Popular Front coalition of Communists, leftists, and labor 
and anti-racist activists alarmed both the FBI and the president, as did the burgeoning 
Fascist groups. In 1936, Hoover sought and received special authority from President 
Roosevelt to secretly surveil Fascists, Communists, and radical trade unionists, but 
the secrecy of this authority impaired his ability to act. With no federal law banning 
radicalism, the FBI could not bring charges against these targets, and with a secret 
authorization, the Bureau could not seek budgetary authority to hire agents.45 The 																																																								
43 U.S. House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Communist 
Activities in the United States, Investigation of Communist Propaganda: Hearings on 
H. Res. 220, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., pt. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1930), 36. On the Fish 
Committee’s debate about political policing, see Luff, Commonsense Anticommunism, 
136–141. 
44 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Immigration and Nationalization, To 
Exclude and Expel Alien Fascists and Communists: Hearings on H.R. 7120, 74th 
Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., 1934). 
45 For the special memo, see the Church Committee report: U.S. Senate, Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 
Final Report 3, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, 94th Cong., 2nd 	
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federal executive branch had little capacity to surveil or police Communists or other 
radicals.46 
 This situation helps explain the origins of the Dies Committee, the progenitor 
of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), in 1938. Congressman 
Martin Dies used his hearings to attack the New Deal and smear government officials 
as reds, as is well known. What is less well understood is that the Dies Committee 
also exposed the lack of federal policing capacity and baited Hoover’s FBI for 
seeming to allow subversives to connive in plain sight. The Dies Committee seized 
authority that the executive branch had, in the view of antiradicals, abdicated.47 In 
																																																																																																																																																														
sess. (Washington, D.C., 1976), 395–397. The Church Committee’s investigation, 
based on interviews as well as reviews of files, likewise found a general cessation of 
political policing from 1924 to 1936, and a halting resumption afterward that was 
hampered by its dubious legal status until 1940, as discussed below. On the FBI’s 
withdrawal from countersubversive policing in these years, see Raymond J. Batvinis, 
The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence (Lawrence, Kans., 2007), 40–51. As Batvinis 
puts it, Stone’s order “dramatically shifted the FBI focus away from the investigation 
of subversives and curtailed any possibility of detecting foreign espionage in the 
United States unless prima facie evidence was brought to the FBI’s attention” (49). 
46 John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr described these circumstances as a “disarray in 
American counterintelligence. In the 1930s the U.S. government had a hodgepodge of 
internal security laws, no clear executive order on what constituted government 
secrets, no clear policy on the security fitness of government personnel with access to 
sensitive information, and divided and unclear authority as to which government 
agencies were responsible for internal security enforcement.” Haynes and Klehr, 
Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven, Conn., 1999), 85–86. 
47 To the frustration of Dies, Hoover refused to aid the committee’s investigation by 
supplying staff or information from FBI files. See J. Edgar Hoover, “Memorandum 
for the Attorney General,” December 9, 1940, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C., Papers of Robert H. Jackson, box 89, folder 11. On the Dies Committee, see 	
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effect, the Dies Committee (and later HUAC) functioned to both surveil and police 
radicals and Communists, by hiring investigators, holding public hearings to question 
suspects, and in some cases developing sufficient information to enable criminal 
prosecution. This was a very public form of surveillance and policing—and a 
democratic one, authorized by elected officials and conducted in open forums.48 
 What remained in place was the prewar system of private detective agencies 
and local police forces, which continued to pursue Communist organizers, strikers, 
and increasingly African American activists with their old alacrity. Local repression 
was especially severe in the South, such as when Communists marched with strikers 
and African Americans in Gastonia, North Carolina, in 1929. Mass protests 
periodically drew redbaiting, most notably the Bonus March of military veterans in 
1931. Immigrants and resident aliens were always subject to far more restrictive laws. 
																																																																																																																																																														
James A. Gross, The Reshaping of the National Labor Relations Board: National 
Labor Policy in Transition, 1937–1947 (Albany, N.Y., 1981); Landon R. Y. Storrs, 
The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left (Princeton, N.J., 
2013), chap. 2; Luff, Commonsense Anticommunism, chap. 9. 
48 Both Ira Katznelson and Ellen Schrecker have made a similar point. As Katznelson 
writes, Roosevelt and other executive branch officials “were apprehensive about 
freewheeling congressional investigations they could not control, in part because they 
were institutional rivals”; he points out that the Dies Committee saw the first 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment to avoid criminal incrimination by a congressional 
witness, Communist leader Earl Browder. Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and 
the Origins of Our Time (New York, 2013), 328–331, quote from 331. Schrecker 
comments that “in many ways, the operation of these [congressional investigative] 
committees paralleled the executive branch,” but “because congressional hearings 
were immune from the due-process requirements that accompanied criminal 
prosecutions, the committees had more leeway to denounce and accuse.” Schrecker, 
The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents (Boston, 2002), 63. 
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Throughout these years, the Department of Labor oversaw numerous deportations and 
visa denials for Communists. It is not that there was no anticommunist repression in 
the interwar years; to the contrary. But it was fragmented and localized, with limited 
coordination among local and federal authorities and private agencies competing for 
business.49 
 During the 1930s, an emboldened civil liberties movement rallied attacks on 
this system as well, decrying police strikebreaking and labor espionage. They 
engineered yet another exposé of political policing with the La Follette Committee, 
which met from 1936 to 1939 to take evidence on employers’ dependence on hired 
muscle and police cronyism to stymie labor and civil rights organizing. As a result, 
the operations of private detective agencies and strikebreaking police were retrenched. 
In May 1939, the La Follette Committee sent an investigator out to interview 
detective agency heads about their current business conditions, and all agreed that 
business was terrible. A former strikebreaker explained: “The La Follette Committee 
investigation put an awful crimp in the market for services in these parts, and the 
existence of the committee still holds things up. Employers don’t want to get 
exposed.”50 																																																								
49 On local anti-radical repression, see Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The 
Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1919–1950 (New York, 2008). For a recent account of 
the ways employers scrambled to police strikers in the 1930s, relying on ad hoc 
networks of private detectives and citizens such as Ralph van Deman, head of U.S. 
military intelligence during World War I, see Kathryn S. Olmsted, Right out of 
California: The 1930s and the Big Business Roots of Modern Conservatism (New 
York, 2015). 
50 U.S. Senate, Oppressive Labor Practices Act: Hearings before a Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., 
1939), 156, 166. 
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 By the late 1930s, then, both executive and delegated political policing of 
citizens had been significantly curtailed, while congressional policing had begun to 
escalate. Covert surveillance had shriveled, while overt, democratic policing grew. 
The trajectory of American political policing was quite different from what theories 
of the surveillance state would predict. Numerous historical accounts paint the FBI as 
a continually expanding empire driven by a power-mad Hoover. Ira Katznelson’s 
Fear Itself is only the most recent version of this interpretation, which relies on a 
historiography produced by scholars who came of age in the era of the Church 
Committee and revelations about later abuses by Hoover’s FBI.51 But longstanding 
dynamics in American political culture—especially suspicion of federal authority—
reversed tendencies toward executive political policing in the interwar years.52 In 																																																								
51 Katznelson, Fear Itself, 326–330; Theoharis and Cox, The Boss; Athan Theoharis, 
“The FBI and the Politics of Anti-Communism, 1920–1945: A Prelude to Power,” in 
Robert Justin Goldstein, Little “Red Scares”: Anti-Communism and Political 
Repression in the United States, 1921–1946 (Surrey, 2014), 23–44; William Preston 
Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933, 2nd ed. 
(Urbana, Ill., 1994). Theoharis rarely acknowledges the changing legislative authority 
for the Bureau’s operations. See, for example, Athan G. Theoharis, “Political Policing 
in the United States: The Evolution of the FBI, 1917–1956,” in Mazower, The 
Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century, 191–212. For a symptomatic recent 
popular account that implies that the FBI operated a broad surveillance and policing 
operation in the interwar years, without supplying much evidence of it, see Tim 
Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI (New York, 2012). For a revisionist account 
of Hoover’s FBI in its later years that emphasizes its bureaucratic autonomy, see 
Beverly Gage, “Deep Throat, Watergate, and the Bureaucratic Politics of the FBI,” 
Journal of Policy History 24, no. 2 (2012): 157–183. 
52 For a helpful early review essay laying out the poles of the debate over the FBI and 
critiquing the Manichean portrait of the agency that has dominated much scholarship, 
see Michal R. Belknap, “Secrets of the Boss’s Power: Two Views of J. Edgar 	
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Liberty and Coercion, Gary Gerstle describes antistatism as a dynamic that forced 
American officials to continually improvise new structures of governance. A powerful 
federal police force was, to this point, possible only during wartime, despite the 
wishes of people like J. Edgar Hoover: “His FBI had acquired the capacity—but not 
the authority—to root radicals out of American life.” To Hoover’s dismay, by the late 
1930s the U.S. had scarcely any capacity for policing radicals, in stark contrast to 
European states.53 Resistance to bureaucracy nevertheless enabled a form of ad hoc 
and popular political policing via the congressional committee.54 																																																																																																																																																														
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 Yet historiographical misconceptions persist about the scope and severity of 
interwar federal political repression. Why? It is an effect of the civil liberties 
movement’s politics of publicity and exposure. Civil liberties campaigns continually 
highlighted, and denounced, repressive activity by federal and private police even as 
police powers diminished. Much of our knowledge of the 1920s Red Scare or the 
1930s employer onslaught against union organizers comes from these clamorous 
public investigations. The abuses loom larger in our historical record than their 
abatement, and the narrative of repression became embedded in mainstream politics 
and historical interpretations. Indeed, some of the leading scholars of American 
repression had deep connections to the civil liberties movement, including Athan 
Theoharis, who served as a consultant for the Church Committee, and William 
Preston Jr., nephew of ACLU head Roger Baldwin. Advocacy and scholarship often 
chimed.55 At the same time, civil libertarians denounced bureaucratic and executive 
authority, bracketing the uncomfortable fact that popular politics produced the 
legislative and political legitimation for much political repression. Analyzing the 
workings of American interwar surveillance and policing shows its essentially 
populist nature, mixing up antiradicalism with antistatism: trade unionists, 
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intellectuals, and federal officials all came under scrutiny. Meanwhile, in Britain, the 
policing of politics continued, largely in secret. 
 
POLITICAL HISTORIES OF INTERWAR BRITAIN do not tend to discuss political 
repression, but it was widespread in these years.56 Britain had also expanded its 
domestic security forces and legal authority to police politics during the war years, 
but these were already quite well established. After the war, while MI5’s staff and 
budget were reduced, there remained a sizable and coordinated national policing 
operation. Moreover, the legal authority for political policing introduced in the 
Defence of the Realm Act was not repealed, but rather was codified in the Emergency 
Powers Act and the Official Secrets Act of 1920, which provided a peacetime 
justification for suppressing dissent.57 Over the course of the 1920s, the government 
tightened its control over local police forces, frequently in response to industrial 
unrest.58 The British possessed a large and well-staffed police force able to coordinate 																																																								
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nationally that held quite sweeping authority to monitor, censor, arrest, and imprison 
those deemed subversive.59 
 Here it is worth noting that political policing targeted Communists, not 
Fascists. Historians have adopted the language of the 1930s that cast Communist 
radicals and Fascist reactionaries as “extremists” who posed an equal threat to British 
political moderation. However, security files released to date reveal extensive 
policing and surveillance of Communists, and much less of Fascists. After 1935, 
British foreign intelligence increasingly focused on German espionage and 
subterfuge, but MI5 paid only desultory attention to domestic Fascists such as Oswald 
Mosley (and the home secretary refused to approve intercepts of Mosley’s mail in 
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1934 and 1936).60 Throughout the 1930s, observers complained about the apparent 
solicitude shown by police for the rights of Fascist protesters, in stark contrast to the 
high rates of prosecution of Communists.61 
 The status of Communism was dubious: was it legal or not? While two 
candidates won parliamentary seats on the Communist ticket in the 1920s, and 
university students formed Communist study groups, Communist activists were 
regularly arrested and prosecuted. Interwar British Communists faced a great deal of 
straightforward political repression. The police raided the headquarters of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in 1924, arrested the editor of the Party’s 
newspaper, the Worker’s Weekly, and carted away all of the party’s files.62 There 
were many arrests, even during periods of relative political calm. Leaders of the party 
endured continued harassment. Albert Inkpin, one of the founders of the CPGB, was 
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arrested in 1920 for printing and circulating communist literature. He was sentenced 
to six months in prison. Three years later, Inkpin was again arrested, along with 
eleven other leaders of the party, and charged with violating the Incitement to Mutiny 
Act of 1797 by distributing seditious literature. All twelve of them were convicted; 
five CPGB leaders were sentenced to a year in prison, and the remainder to six-month 
terms. In Birmingham in 1921, four Communists, three of them ex-soldiers, were 
charged and sentenced to several months’ imprisonment for inciting disaffection in 
the military. In Cardiff that same year, a Communist organizer was sentenced to three 
months for saying that the police were paid agents of the capitalists. In Glasgow in 
1925, a conference of forty-four Communist women was raided by a force of thirty to 
forty police officers.63 In Manchester in 1930, a Communist organizer visiting from 
the U.S. was caught with a list of names of Communists, and sentenced to a month in 
prison. Also in 1930, an organizer was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for 
leafleting British soldiers in Aldershot, calling on them to refuse to “shoot down the 
heroic Indian workers and peasants” then organizing against the Raj. In 1931, a 
woman running on the Communist ticket for a parliamentary seat was sentenced to 
three months’ hard labor for inciting a crowd during a speech. Moreover, during 
moments of mass unrest, such as the 1926 general strike and the 1934 unemployed 
marches, there were hundreds or perhaps thousands of arrests and imprisonments of 
strike and protest leaders who were also Communists, or suspected of being 
Communists, and prosecuted for inciting disorder.64 
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 A few things are notable about these arrests. These Communists were arrested 
for being Communists, for advocating political ideas in public and private, publishing 
articles and making speeches, and organizing a political party, not for espionage or 
subterfuge, or for actions unrelated to their political activity. Authorities prosecuted 
Communists using a creative range of laws, from the 1797 Mutiny Act to various 
public-order laws. These arrests carried significant prison sentences. And these were 
public arrests, reported in newspapers, with Communist advocacy the declared crime. 
This political policing was overt.65 
 Of particular concern to British officials was the potential for insurgency 
within the military. In 1931, those fears seemed to come true when the government 
imposed severe pay cuts on the navy, and sailors in the Home Fleet, anchored off 
Invergordon in Scotland, launched a protest. As the uprising spread, the government 
began to call it a “mutiny,” and suspected that Communists were at work. The CPGB 
had very little to do with the episode, but the government launched a purge of the 
navy, discharging over a thousand seamen. Two party leaders were charged with 
inciting mutiny, and sentenced to three years and twenty months in prison, 
respectively. This episode occurred the same year as the Bonus March of military 
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Communist arrests and prosecutions is otherwise scattered. 
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veterans in the U.S., which was also alleged to be a Communist plot and violently 
suppressed; however, no Americans were tried for participating in the march.66 
 Initially there was little public debate or protest of these overt instances of 
repression, in part because the wartime civil liberties movement had scattered in the 
early 1920s. By 1934, however, police harassment of hunger marchers helped spark 
the organization of a new British civil liberties group, the National Council on Civil 
Liberties (NCCL). The organization campaigned against a proposed stringent new law 
that would formally criminalize advocacy of the “alteration of the established law, 
form of Government, or Constitution of the United Kingdom.” Public protest resulted 
in the amendment of the law into an “Incitement to Disaffection Act,” to apply only to 
efforts to “seduce” members of the armed forces away from their duties, with 
Communist organizers imagined as the most likely seducers. This defeat was 
compounded by the implementation of the Public Order Act of 1936, ostensibly 
enacted to crack down on British Union of Fascists marches, when the law was 
promptly applied to striking miners in Nottinghamshire.67 The NCCL had little to 
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show for its efforts, and British civil libertarians saw their legal climate worsen in the 
interwar years.68 
 While their protests of these overt and public acts of anticommunist repression 
had little effect, civil libertarians were unaware of, and unable to challenge, the covert 
political surveillance that was invisible to them. One reason for their ignorance was 
Britain’s “culture of secrecy,” which shielded much government activity from sight. 
Many historians have written about the extraordinary capacity of the British state to 
hide its activities by the early twentieth century. David Vincent has provided a 
sweeping account of the structures and policies that enabled this culture, from a 
stringent Official Secrets Act that criminalized any “unauthorized” release of 
information about governmental initiatives, to the emergence of a tight-knit elite 
professional civil service bound by a code of “honourable secrecy.”69 It was very 
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difficult for citizens to gather basic information about the activities of the police and 
the policies of the government toward domestic radicalism. Activists were also 
hampered by the cultural image of the “indulgent bobby,” which framed British police 
as gentle, friendly, and nonpolitical, in sharp contrast to the secret police and agents 
provocateurs of France and Germany.70 An inquiry into police procedure in 1929 
reassured the public that the police had “never, as a body, pressed cases unfairly 
against suspected persons; that they have never resorted to that kind of exhausting, 
even torturing examination known as the Third Degree; and that they have not 
interfered over-zealously with the rights of the public.”71 Both Labour and 
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Conservative politicians tended to praise rather than criticize policing practices, 
leaving little political space for civil libertarians.72 
 Unbeknownst to the British public, the British government undertook a much 
broader covert campaign of surveillance and policing of Communists in the interwar 
years. In a 1935 memo, MI5 laid out its existing practices, which had become so far-
reaching that some reduction was necessary. MI5 told the Home Office that its 
existing efforts to “make exhaustive enquiries” about all British Communists had 
proved unnecessary, and it would henceforth confine its investigations to “the leaders 
of the Party and those individuals who are known to engage in illegal activities and to 
act in this country as direct agents of the Comintern.” MI5 would maintain its 
surveillance of the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement, the Friends of the 
Soviet Union, and other “subsidiary bodies of the Comintern.” Factories producing 
war materials and other vital government supplies would remain under scrutiny. 
Communists working in “Government Establishments” would be identified, and 
efforts would be made to “neutralize the chances of mischievous activity by and 
through them.” And finally, MI5 would “continue our policy as before of identifying 																																																								
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any members of the Armed Forces likely to be actively engaging in subversive 
activities in their units and arrange, as hitherto, for their discharge.” This large 
undertaking would rely on mail interception as well as the national network of police 
constables who would advise when Communists “obtain employment, or attempt to 
cause industrial trouble” at factories and worksites considered “Security Points.”73 
 Read in isolation, the scale of surveillance contemplated may seem like a 
grandiose fantasy. Security files released to the National Archives, however, confirm 
its outlines. MI5 tapped phones, intercepted mail, and sent agents to tail a remarkable 
number of people in the interwar years, from Cecil Day Lewis, later the poet laureate, 
because he had sent a letter to a leading Communist; to novelist André Malraux, 
because he had fought with the Republicans in Spain; to Dorothy Galton, an expert on 
beekeeping and an administrator of the School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, because she joined a Russian study circle.74 These surveillance operations 
tracked subjects over decades, and often concluded that the targets were innocent of 
espionage or disloyalty, but worth tracking just in case. For example, historian 
Christopher Hill joined the Communist Party in 1935. MI5 began keeping tabs on him 
that year, and continued to surveil him until 1962.75 
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 As these examples show, Security Service suspicions fell upon elites as well 
as rank-and-file workers. Yet working-class Communists came under dramatically 
more scrutiny—and suffered more severe policing. In late 1926, Harry Pollitt, a 
boilermaker by trade and the head of the Communist Party of Great Britain, applied to 
work at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich. The Arsenal, which sat just east of the city of 
London, developed and built armaments and ordnance, part of Britain’s sizable state-
owned munitions industry. Jobs at Woolwich offered stable hours and good wages, 
and were highly desirable in interwar Britain. But within a few hours, a 
superintendent at the Arsenal stepped in: Pollitt was a known Communist, and thus a 
security risk. Although Pollitt tried to coax the superintendent to let him stay (“I did 
my best to convert him to our policy and principles,” he told a friend), he was fired 
before he had a chance to start work.76 The episode startled MI5’s Vernon Kell and 
the War Office. Could Communists infest Britain’s war machine? Within a few 
months, the War Office issued a confidential policy to tighten up its pre-hire 
screening to prohibit the employment of “undesirable” persons.77 
 That June, in the aftermath of the General Strike, the Cabinet took up the 
matter. “It was understood that Bolshevist Communism included a belief in the 
employment of revolutionary means to enforce its doctrines upon the nation.” 
Therefore the Cabinet enacted a bar on Communists working for the government: 
The Cabinet agreed that the following policy should be adopted by 
Government Departments (the Civilian as well as the Service Departments) 
in dealing with Communists: 
 (a) Persons who can be shown by reasonable evidence to be actively 
engaged in the dissemination of anti-constitutional and revolutionary 																																																								
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propaganda, either oral or written, should be discharged forthwith and 
without pension or other superannuation benefit; 
 (b) Persons who merely label themselves as Communists without 
taking any active part in the furtherance of Communism should be 
eliminated as and when opportunity offers, i.e., by discharge on reduction.78 
 
The Cabinet formally reaffirmed this policy in 1931 and 1936.79 MI5 took over the 
screening of potential employees, coordinating with local police to vet applicants and 
regularly updating lists of suspected Communists working in ordnance factories such 
as Woolwich Arsenal, at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, and at the 
Royal Dockyards at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham. From 1927 until the 
outbreak of World War II, thousands of workers were screened, and many suspected 
of Communist sympathies were barred from employment or fired from government 
service.80 In the interwar years, MI5 saw Communism as a problem of the working 
class, as Kell explained in a 1933 memo: “There are Communists employed in the 
Post Office, in Royal Naval Dockyards, in the Civil Service, and in factories 
employed on secret Government work.” He added, “it requires little imagination to 																																																								
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envisage, in a time of emergency, dislocation of the telegraph service, sabotage in the 
docks, leakage of information from a Government office, or the destruction of a 
munition factory.”81 This vetting regime involved a very large number of workers. 
The “industrial civil service” included 123,000 workers in factories and shipyards, 
comprising a quarter of the total governmental workforce in the interwar years.82 
Evidence suggests that the government also sought to block the employment of 
Communists in privately owned munitions factories.83 By July 1940, an official 
complained that “The Service establishments covered by this vetting have grown out 
of all knowledge. M.I.5. are called upon to check something like 25,000 names a 
month.”84 
 This policy was never announced to the public or to government workers; it 
was a closely guarded secret, albeit one communicated to all ministers and senior civil 
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service managers.85 Workers tagged as potential Communists were not told the 
reasons for their firing or denial of employment. Several officials chafed at the policy. 
As Treasury Controller Russell Scott commented, “If a Communist is eligible for 
election to Parliament, it is illogical to say that one cannot serve in the Civil Service 
(provided that he observes the rules of that Service). Moreover dismissals on political 
grounds are objectionable.”86 The First Lord of the Admiralty, William Bridgeman, 
pressed the Cabinet to announce the policy and give a suspected worker the 
“opportunity of choosing whether he shall give up active participation in communism, 
or continue his activities and be discharged forthwith.”87 But this internal dissent 
never leaked out of the confines of the Cabinet. The culture of “honourable secrecy” 
held fast. 
 Despite its formal scope, this anticommunist policy was not enforced for 
“black-coated” office workers (referred to as the “non-industrial Civil Service”), 
according to files released to date.88 Double-agents such as Donald Maclean, recruited 
to the Civil Service and assigned to the Foreign Office in 1935, and Guy Burgess, 
hired into the foreign intelligence service MI6 in 1938, escaped scrutiny despite their 																																																								
85 The policy was formally announced at a meeting of heads of ministries and 
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open involvement with the CPGB while at university.89 By 1946, the government 
began to realize that it had misjudged the situation: “The main risk to be feared from 
the Communist Party in the pre-war period was one of unrest in the industrial sphere 
and in the Armed Forces of the Crown,” explained a Security Service memo. “The 
higher social status of the present membership has brought a new danger to the fore as 
the scientists and professional workers, who are now in the Party ranks, have access 
to far more secret information than had the pre-war membership.”90 Belatedly, it 
became clear that the assiduous interwar screening policy had been misconceived. 
“Honourable secrecy” protected elite spies with a shroud of trust denied to manual 
and industrial workers. 
 Secrecy permitted the government a wide degree of latitude in deciding 
whether and how to punish suspected Communists. For example, Wilfred Vernon was 
a technical assistant at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, which 
conducted aeronautical research and development. He was an active member of his 
local CPGB group, and MI5 had been tracking him since 1934; an informant at 
Farnborough told them Vernon was a “cypher contact between this area and Party 
H.Q. in London.” In 1937, the local police discovered in his possession a number of 
secret documents concerning aircraft design. Vernon was tried under the Official 
Secrets Act and convicted over his vociferous denials, which were supported by the 																																																								
89 There is a large body of popular works on elite British spies such as Burgess and 
Maclean, and rather less scholarly research on them. See, for instance, Ben Macintyre, 
A Spy among Friends: Kim Philby and the Great Betrayal (London, 2015). Key 
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National Council on Civil Liberties. His punishment was quite light: a fine of £50 and 
dismissal from Farnborough. By 1939, MI5 believed that Vernon had “not ‘done 
anything’ for a long time” and appeared to have left the party, and he was permitted to 
serve as an instructor at the Osterley Home Guard Training School.91 Wartime 
exigency sped the rehabilitation process for others as well. Christopher Hill, having 
been denied a job as a historian for the War Office, was in 1943 a major in the 
Intelligence Corps. He was later seconded to the Foreign Office, and assigned to head 
the Russia Desk, in part due to his fluency in Russian.92 
 In other cases, MI5 took a harder line. Percy Glading was a grinder at the 
Woolwich Arsenal. In 1928, he was fired for being a Communist. The Amalgamated 
Engineering Union took up his case, and involved the Trades Union Congress in a 
lengthy defense of workers’ right to hold independent political views.93 Glading lost 
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his job, but he continued his involvement with the CPGB. In 1937, he returned to 
Woolwich and reestablished ties with old colleagues. His network tried to smuggle 
weapons designs out of the arsenal, but they were caught by MI5 in one of its rare 
successful spy prosecutions between the wars. In 1938, Glading was convicted of 
violating the Official Secrets Act and given a six-year prison term, and his co-
conspirators George Whomack and Albert Williams got four years and three years, 
respectively.94 Other files suggest that suspicion fell on Communists for their political 
ideas, and charges of sabotage were never substantiated. For example, MI5 began 
tracking John Salisbury, a shipwright at the Royal Dockyard at Plymouth, in 1931 
when they intercepted a membership list for his newly formed Friends of the Soviet 
Union branch. Over the next several years, he was suspected of sabotaging several 
submarines. Salisbury had been involved in the Invergordon Mutiny, and it appears 
likely that his politics, rather than any hard evidence, aroused suspicion. He was fired 
from Plymouth Dockyard in 1936, along with several other suspected Communist 
workers, on flimsy evidence. They were permanently blacklisted from government 
work.95 
 Yet some industrial workers received more evenhanded treatment. For 
example, Arthur Hunt was hired at Woolwich Arsenal as a skilled tool-and-gauge 
worker in 1925. In 1931, Special Branch identified him as a Communist, and noted 
suspicion that he was supplying information about Arsenal output to a Soviet handler. 
For the next ten years, detectives regularly tailed Hunt. In 1938 he was questioned on 
																																																																																																																																																														
Communications Department,” Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 4 (2004): 
610–631. 
94 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, 182–185. 
95 TNA, KV 2/2497–2500; TNA, LAB 8/1032. 
		 48	
suspicion of removing documents from the Arsenal, and in 1939 he was arrested for 
being rowdy at an unemployed workers’ march. Nothing conclusive demonstrated his 
disloyalty, and MI5 did not move against him. After he retired from the Arsenal in 
1952, MI5 kept tabs on him for several more years, taking note when he paid a visit to 
Harry Pollitt. Hunt likely was a Communist activist, based on the evidence in his file, 
but he did not suffer any adverse consequences for it.96 
 Interwar surveillance could detect suspicious figures quite early and 
accurately. Contemporaries and historians have often derided British intelligence for 
missing important spy cases unfolding under their noses, the Cambridge Five most 
prominently. But these files show an alert and sophisticated intelligence operation. 
These investigations were well beyond the capacity of the American state in the 
interwar years at the federal level, or any level, and they long preceded the atomic 
espionage fears that often are cited as a reason for such surveillance. In light of all this 
evidence, some known at the time and some unknown, it is hard to square the image 
of Britain as a moderate redoubt of civil liberties in these years. Indeed, these findings 
reveal that long before the Cold War and the United States’ creation of the federal 
loyalty-security program, Britain had in place its own national loyalty-security 
program, and its own regime for scrutinizing the loyalty of citizens. The interwar 
American domestic-security state looks positively amateur in comparison. 
 The specific mix of secrecy and publicity in Britain’s security regime suggests 
a lot about the nature of its political culture. Police did not hesitate to openly watch 
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and persecute Communist activists, and there was little public challenge to their 
authority to do so. Revolutionaries could be repressed without backlash. But security 
services surreptitiously surveilled citizens who had not engaged in openly seditious 
practices or otherwise challenged the government, because such surveillance violated 
popular discourses about the legitimate workings of the state. As George Orwell 
explained in 1940, “Everyone believes in his heart that the law can be, ought to be, 
and on the whole, will be, impartially administered.” He added, “The professed 
enemies of society have this feeling as strongly as anyone else.”97 In practice, equality 
under the law was illusory. 
 Why, despite ample evidence to the contrary, does this interwar 
anticommunist policing and repression figure so little in histories of modern Britain? 
Scholarship based on the archives of the “secret state” has long been widely available. 
Many of the files that document the secret governmental anticommunist bar have 
been declassified for a number of years, yet historians have not written about it. This 
analysis suggests that it simply does not fit into standard narratives of the era, because 
it did not feature in the political discourse of the time. Because the scope and scale of 
British political policing was largely unknown to its subjects, they did not organize 
against it, or even comment on it. Those people who were fired or barred from 
employment as suspected Communists could only suspect the causes of their 
treatment. They could not protest what they did not know. 
 Historians interpret the words and deeds of historical actors, and in the 
interwar years there was little discourse in Britain about widespread and systematic 
violations of civil liberties. On the contrary, interwar “little England” was imagined as 
a country that uniquely respected civil liberties and free association, sustained by 																																																								
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common sense, gentlemanly leadership, and anti-intellectualism.98 When a historian 
such as Harriet Jones says that British anticommunism was “relatively restrained” due 
to “a party system which tended to encourage reasoned debate rather than radical 
extremes of thought, and a professional Civil Service which provided a stable and 
experienced framework for policy advice and implementation,” she is reflecting views 
widely held by her subjects.99 Here is the challenge for historical analysis. Evidence 
produced by interwar historical actors—political organizing, cultural production—
rarely intersects with what we now know about British surveillance. The “secret state” 
rumbled at times like an underground tremor, but it was rarely visible. 
 For historians, the difficulty is to balance the evidence of political policing 
with its public expression. It is easy to find evidence of the depredations of American 
political police, because they were exposed at the time, and to tell a narrative that 
integrates this story into a broader interpretation of American history. It is much 
harder to do so in the British case. As with other areas of historical research, we are 
obliged to read across and against the grain, and sometimes to argue with our 
historical subjects, those who were innocent of what we have discovered, and those 
whose political advocacy draws our attention to what they wanted to expose. 
 
WAR QUICKLY CHANGED THE RELATIONSHIP between the U.S. and the UK, as both 
countries replayed their World War I–era mobilizations. MI5 feared that German 
intelligence operatives had an open playing field in the U.S. In 1938, after tipping off 																																																								
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the clueless FBI to Nazi agent Guenther Rumrich’s large American spy ring, MI5 sent 
senior agent Guy Liddell to the U.S. to assess the situation. He reported back that the 
U.S. presented a security problem, as “this country really does not realize the 
necessity of dealing stringently with spies and saboteurs,” and “the United States 
Authorities have no adequate machinery” for counter-subversive policing.100 As he 
wrote, the U.S. had begun to build its own machinery. This was a publicly debated 
initiative, authorized by law and approved by Congress. It involved legislation 
authorizing the FBI and other federal agencies to investigate and police Communists 
and Fascists, as well as banning them from the federal civil service, and a rapid 
expansion in the Bureau’s staffing.101 The drumbeat of publicity from the Dies 
Committee, coupled with the Nazi-Soviet Aggression Pact, created strong pressure for 
a crackdown. In 1939, J. Edgar Hoover testified in Congress that the FBI had 
“compiled extensive indices of individuals, groups, and organizations” that were 
“engaged in subversive activities, in espionage activities,” and asked for special 
funding to continue building the lists.102 The following year, Attorney General Robert 
Jackson announced the government’s plan for “surveillance of individuals and groups 
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within the United States who are sympathetic with the systems or designs of foreign 
dictators.”103 
 This was hardly a “secret state.” Rather, civil libertarians and government 
officials emphasized that this surveillance program would be undertaken by 
“responsible employees of the Federal Government” who had been trained “in the 
rights of the citizen as well as in methods of crime suppression.” This stood in sharp 
contrast to the “agents of vigilante groups” or private detective agencies that had been 
responsible for civil-liberties abuses in the past.104 The ACLU registered its wary 
support: while the FBI required oversight to “curtail its tendencies to assume the role 
of a political police,” the Department of Justice had been “in principle sensitive to the 
maintenance of civil liberties.”105 Congressional publicity about the lack of federal 																																																								
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authority to surveil subversives, and the abuses committed by detectives dressed up in 
state authority, had made the case for authorizing a permanent federal policing 
bureaucracy. 
 In many ways, that bureaucracy learned from the British security regime. 
After the Rumrich debacle, Prime Minister Winston Churchill installed a British 
contingent in Washington to train up the FBI. From 1940, as Raymond Batvinis has 
shown, MI5 maintained a regular presence in Washington, via the British Security 
Coordination, a standing body, to coordinate among Canadian, American, and British 
intelligence. According to Batvinis, “Hoover’s introduction to the British was a 
watershed event in the formation of the FBI’s counterintelligence program,” which 
“laid the foundation for U.S. counterintelligence for the remainder of the century.”106 
Very rapidly, under the tutelage of British intelligence, the U.S. built and staffed a 
large domestic political policing force. Britain also augmented its prewar police 
machinery with more staff and funding, authorized by new emergency powers 
legislation that permitted, among other things, detention of citizens without charge or 
trial. For the most part, however, Britain’s extensive and secret political policing 
continued as before, only magnified.107 
 During and after the war, the U.S. and UK collaborated in both domestic and 
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their domestic security services, especially in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s first 
atomic bomb test in 1949. With the revelation that Manhattan Project scientists, 
including British citizen Karl Fuchs, had shared information with the Soviet Union, 
recriminations mounted. British newspaper headlines blared: “Americans demand: No 
more atom secrets for Britain.”108 The proper balance between secrecy and publicity 
became a flashpoint, as Britain insisted on handling Fuchs’s case, along with other 
domestic security matters, behind closed doors, while U.S. officials demanded more 
information about British screening of government workers. Unlike the post–World 
War I demobilization, the FBI’s new bureaucratic authority and capacity to conduct 
secret surveillance remained. At the same time, the regime of congressional public 
exposure and policing of Communists reached its apogee in the hearings of HUAC 
and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. 
 As HUAC began interrogating Hollywood actors, civil servants, and scientists, 
British observers increasingly drew a distinction between American excess and 
British toleration. “There are some who are so forgetful of British traditions that they 
even regard it as treachery for an English man or woman to support the cause of those 
who may be fighting against us,” wrote the New Statesman in 1951. “We shall be 
surprised if these tactics meet with much success in England.”109 Repeatedly, British 
observers decried the “hysteria” and public pillorying of American loyalty 
investigations.110 																																																								
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 Meanwhile, American civil libertarians sought lessons from the British. In 
1947, the Rockefeller Foundation funded a multi-year project at Cornell University to 
study the effects of the new regime of loyalty-security investigations. Robert E. 
Cushman, an eminent scholar of civil liberties and something of an Anglophile, 
assembled a group of scholars to research the matter. He sent Eleanor Bontecou, a 
seasoned civil rights lawyer, to Britain to investigate its implementation of loyalty 
screening. Her report found that the British government had “acted with moderation 
and good sense, and with a continuing realization of the possible impact of the policy 
on the liberties of the individual.” She praised the doughty spirit of the British 
approach, as “such a program of austerity as to dogma and ideology lends no aid and 
comfort to the witch hunters and fanatics.”111 What she did not know, nor did 
American officials or British citizens, was the scope of loyalty screening that had 
gone on for years. 
 
THIS ANALYSIS SHOWS THE SIGNIFICANCE of the structure of the state to its security 
regime: the decentralized U.S. state was less able to coordinate policing across 
jurisdictions, whereas the centralized British state was able to operate across the 
whole country. It also reveals how social dynamics shaped policing, with workers 																																																																																																																																																														
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subject to dramatically more repression in Britain, and elites subject to populist forms 
of public policing in the U.S. More democratic policing inhibited the exercise of 
discretion by American officials, while more secrecy permitted the British to build a 
quiet surveillance leviathan. Each security regime reflected deep social and cultural 
formations that are not visible through abstractions such as the “surveillance state.” 
 What does this comparison offer for advancing our understanding of modern 
political policing? It shows that frameworks like the “secret state” are overdue for 
reconsideration. Rather than taking secrecy as a premise, we should ask it as a 
question: What was secret from whom? How was surveillance conducted and 
authorized? How and when did police choose to repress particular political actors, and 
was this covert or overt? Analyzing surveillance and policing together—what did 
authorities know, and what did they do about it?—can enable us to build new 
empirical understandings of the development of the modern state, and the particular 
political subjectivities that it produced. Security regimes were always embedded in 
social relations and available for various interests to mobilize. As Foucault wrote, 
policing “did not function in a single direction. It was in fact a double-entry system: it 
had to correspond, by manipulating the machinery of justice, to the immediate wishes 
of the king, but it was also capable of responding to solicitations from below.”112 
Recovering these solicitations is essential for writing the social history of the modern 
security state, and the ways in which citizens often collaborated in its construction. 
 The challenge of integrating these new studies of surveillance into broader 
interpretive frameworks remains. Intelligence scholars have often remarked on the 
difficulty of accounting for covert action—the “missing dimension”: how can the 
significance of subterfuge be assessed, especially when nearly all historical actors 																																																								
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were ignorant of it?113 Our archival discoveries estrange us from our historical 
subjects. It is awkward to learn that in 1940, as George Orwell issued his stirring call 
to patriotic arms in “The Lion and the Unicorn,” Special Branch had been keeping a 
file on Eric Blair since 1929.114 We know something they could not, alienating us 
even further from a past we struggle to apprehend. Historical practice involves trying 
to get into the heads of our historical subjects while also scrutinizing them from an 
analytical distance, and the discovery of facts unknown to them crystallizes the 
contradictions of this posture. How can historical subjectivities be synthesized with 
the workings of the secret police? 
 It is helpful to remember that archival findings have no stable meaning, and 
historical actors would interpret them within their available frameworks, just as we 
do. A useful heuristic is to try to imagine what Eric Blair or Harry Pollitt or Roger 
Baldwin might say if we could tell them what we have found out. R. G. Collingwood 
called this trick “historical reenactment,” and E. H. Carr “imaginative 
understanding.”115 It requires not some sort of mystical communing, but thoughtful 
reflection grounded in historical evidence about the ideologies, cultures, and 
experiences our subjects inhabited. It would take another article to sketch out what 																																																								
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such an effort might yield for this story. As a starting place, many of its American 
subjects would probably not be impressed to learn that the British regime was more 
stringent, and would continue to doubt the legitimacy of American federal 
surveillance authority. Many of its British subjects would focus on whether agents 
respected the privacy and dignity of the surveilled, and raise issues of “fair play,” but 
concede the state’s right to police radicals. What becomes immediately obvious is that 
our contemporary notions about civil liberties, state power, and surveillance have 
limited purchase on the ideological landscape we seek to understand. Venturing this 
imaginative exercise opens up new lines of thinking about the cultural forces that 
produced and legitimated each security regime, and suggests possibilities for how we 
might bring surveillance and policing back into the “social history of politics.”116 
 Some closing thoughts: Looking back from our present moment, how are we 
to interpret this story? We are living in an era when a global security state has been 
constructed before our eyes, one that surpasses the wildest dreams of J. Edgar Hoover 
and Vernon Kell. In our time, as in theirs, authorities invoke the stealth and 
subterfuge of the “enemy” as a rationale for sweeping surveillance, with militant 
Islam standing in for Communism. Often authorities argue that surveillance protects 
the innocent—if citizens have nothing to hide, they should have nothing to fear—and 
permits targeted and precise policing of the guilty, or prevention of crime before it 
can be committed. Cold War–era surveillance increasingly operates in these 
discussions as a model of warranted policing that preserved democracy and helped 
defeat a stealthy enemy.117 In this context, the question of how Western states reacted 																																																								
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to fears of Communist subversion is not just a historical curiosity; it is a discourse that 
is itself a historical force. A more precise understanding of how these security 
regimes developed and operated is needed now. 
 What stands out about much modern civil-liberties discourse is its resolute 
focus on autocratic executive power and its willfully averted gaze from the legislative 																																																																																																																																																														
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enactment of repressive measures. A civil-liberties bromide repeated in the titles of 
numerous “sunshine” laws and policies promises that “sunlight is said to be the best 
of disinfectants”: exposure and publicity are the means by which an informed public 
can fight political repression.118 This populist way of thinking continually brackets the 
moments when an informed democratic public elects to empower the state to police 
politics. Civil libertarians in our era are not only facing a problem of secrecy. We also 
have a C-SPAN problem, named after the American television channel that 
broadcasts congressional proceedings in all their numbing inanity: repression enacted 
in plain sight. Focusing on the bureaucratic imperative of political repression can blur 
the political will that sustains it. 
 An air of hopelessness often pervades theoretical writing that envisions the 
apparent inevitability of ever more sweeping and impregnable security regimes. In 
Homo Sacer, Agamben insists on the futility of political action for citizens subject to 
powerful sovereignties. “Until a completely new politics—that is, a politics no longer 
founded on the exception of bare life—is at hand,” he wrote, “every theory and every 
praxis will remain imprisoned and immobile.”119 Protest is pointless, he suggests. E. 
P. Thompson saw a similar cynicism at play within the British left, where “a 
profoundly pessimistic determinism” produced “a loose rhetoric in which civil rights 
and democratic practices are discounted as camouflage, or as the relics of ‘bourgeois 
liberalism.’” Thompson dismissed these “half-truths,” insisting instead on the 
“immense variety of forms of state power, traditions of law and of civil rights, and of 
																																																								
118 Louis Brandeis, “What Publicity Can Do,” Harper’s Weekly, December 20, 1913, 
10–13, here 10. 
119 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford, Calif., 1998), 13. 
		 61	
popular expectations and resistance.” Exposure was necessary but not sufficient. 
Politics mattered, and it was the specificity of historical experience that enabled 
political mobilization: “the most immediate and consequent struggles to maintain 
liberty are, exactly, about kinds and places, cases and precedents, and the bringing of 
power to particular account.”120 
 Historical analysis can illuminate what was unknown about previous security 
regimes, and denaturalize what seems typical about contemporary ones. As public 
fear escalates about terrorist attacks and international reactionary movements, and 
popular pressure mounts for more political policing, we need more and better histories 
to inform debates about securing and extending democracy in a new age of extremes. 
In 1979, E. P. Thompson said that historians must “renew the nerve of outrage and we 
have to alert the public conscience” so that citizens might “become jurors in their own 
case.”121 To do so, first we have to get the story straight. 
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